Given a system with n > 3t + 1 processes, where t is the tolerated number of faulty ones, we present a fast asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol that can reach agreement in O(t) expected running time. This improves the O(n 2 ) expected running time of Abraham, Dolev, and Halpern [1]. Furthermore, if n = (3 + ε)t for any ε > 0, our protocol can reach agreement in O(1/ε) expected running time. This improves the result of Feldman and Micali [7] (with constant expected running time when n > 4t).
Introduction
The Byzantine Agreement (BA) problem, first introduced by Pease, Shostak, and Lamport [11, 12] , is a fundamental problem in distributed computing. Given n processes, t of which being faulty, the problem consists for all correct processes to agree on one of the input values. The faulty processes might deviate from the algorithm assigned to them arbitrarily, e.g., to prevent correct processes from agreeing on one of their input values.
A lot of work has been devoted to the problem in the last three decades. Despite the effort, the Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement (ABA) problem, where the communication between processes can take an arbitrary amount of time, is still not very well understood. Certain results are however known. For example, it is known that the problem is impossible to solve if n 3t [9, 12] . Any ABA protocol assuming n > 3t is called optimally resilient. According to the seminal result of [8] , any deterministic ABA protocol must have some non-terminating execution.
Faced with the impossibility result [8] , a natural direction of research is to design efficient randomized Byzantine agreement protocol. This direction was started with the work of Ben-or [3] , Rabin [13] , and Bracha [4] . Remarkably, Canetti and Rabin [6] proposed an ABA protocol with constant expected running time and overwhelming probability to terminate. With a randomized ABA protocol the best that can be achieved is to have every execution terminate with probability one. Such protocols are said to be almostsurely terminating [1] .
Several almost-surely terminating ABA protocols were proposed. In 1983, Ben-Or [3] proposed an almost-surely terminating ABA protocol for n > 5t, which runs in exponential expected time. One year later, Bracha [4] presented an almost-surely terminating ABA, which also runs in exponential expected time, but with optimal resilience, i.e., for n > 3t. In 1988, Feldman and Micali [7] presented an almostsurely terminating ABA protocol with constant expected time, assuming however n > 4t. Twenty years later, Abraham, Dolev, and Halpern [1] presented an almost-surely terminating optimally resilient ABA protocol with polynomial efficiency (the expected running time is O(n 2 )). In some sense, state-of-the-art results for almost-surely terminating ABA are [7] and [1] : optimally resilience with polynomial efficiency on the one hand, or constant expected time, assuming however n > 4t, on the other hand.
We present in this paper a new almost-surely terminating ABA protocol that achieves a significant progress with respect to the state-of-the-art. For n > 3t, our protocol completes in O(t) expected running time. If n > (3 + ε)t where ε is an arbitrary positive constant, our protocol has O(1/ε) expected running time. Table 1 aggregates these results in the context of related work.
Most ABA protocols follow the idea of Ben-or [3] , Rabin [13] , and Bracha [4] , namely a reduction of the ABA problem to the implementation of a common coin (namely, a source of common randomness with certain properties). Specially, the reduction of Bracha [4] is optimally resilient and runs in constant expected time. Thus, designing efficient ABA protocols could be solved by designing efficient common
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Resilience Expected Running Time Ben-Or (1983) [3] n > 5t O(2 n ) Bracha (1984) [4] n > 3t O(2 n ) Feldman, Micali (1988) [7] n > 4t O(1) Abraham, Dolev, Halpern (2008) [1] n > 3t O(n 2 ) This paper n > 3t O(t) This paper n > (3 + ε)t, (ε > 0) O(1/ε) Table 1 . Results for almost-surely terminating ABA problem coins. The protocol of Feldman and Micali [7] includes a method to implement a common coin by making use of a verifiable secret sharing (VSS) scheme. (For a complete description of the reduction from VSS to ABA, see [5] .) Canetti and Rabin [6] have an implementation of asynchronous verifiable secret sharing (AVSS) with constant expected running time but overwhelming probability to terminate (the resulting ABA protocol is thus not almost-surely terminating). Recently, King and Saia [10] introduced a novel technique for implementing common coin via a spectral method. This paper follows the reduction from (some form of) AVSS to ABA. We first recall the standard AVSS scheme [6] . Roughly speaking, an AVSS scheme consists of a sharing phase and a reconstruction phase, involving a process designated as the dealer which has a value (usually called secret) to share. In the sharing phase, the dealer shares its secret among all processes and each process locally verifies that a unique secret is being considered. In the reconstruction phase, the processes reconstruct the secret from the shares. The correctness of AVSS lies on two properties: (1) if the dealer is correct, then all correct processes will reconstruct the secret of the dealer, and (2) if the dealer is faulty, then all correct processes will reconstruct the same value that is fixed in the sharing phase.
We introduce in this paper a variant of AVSS called IVSS (standing for inferable (asynchronous) verifiable secret sharing). Our IVSS scheme has a weaker correctness property than AVSS, but provides strong fault-detection ability. Specifically, IVSS requires that if the correctness property of AVSS does not hold in an invocation of some round, then correct processes will ignore (or infer) at least t(n − 3t) faulty pairs from that round on. Here, by a faulty pair, we mean a pair of processes of which at least one is faulty. In our IVSS protocol, secrets are shared through symmetric bivariate polynomials. If processes reconstruct different secrets in the protocol, the symmetry of polynomials can be used to infer faulty pairs.
There are existing secret sharing protocols with fault-detection capacity, e.g., shunning verifiable secret sharing in [2] and secret sharing with dispute control in [1] . These protocols are composed of several levels of secret sharing subprotocols, while our protocol is very simple with only one-level secret sharing subprotocol. In all previous approaches, the Byzantine agreement algorithm proceeds round by round and, once a round is over, the correct processes forget it and never look back to it. In fact, if a correct process could look back at the history of invocations of the secret sharing protocol, it may infer more failures. We implement this history-based checking mechanism in a certification subprotocol. This subprotocol is invoked when the Byzantine agreement protocol is initialized and then runs concurrently with all invocations of our IVSS protocol. The main technique for inferring faults in our protocol is also different from [1, 2] . Our fault-detection mechanism is based on symmetric polynomials which enable our protocol to infer a linear number of faults when secret sharing does not succeed, while protocols in [1, 2] can generally infer only one fault.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the asynchronous computing model and the Byzantine agreement problem. In Section 3, we state the properties of our IVSS scheme and describe an algorithm that implements it. In Section 4, we show how to obtain our fast ABA protocol from our IVSS scheme. For space limitations, some algorithms and proofs are given in the appendices.
Model and Definitions
The Model. We consider an asynchronous computing model in the classical sense, e.g., [1, 6] . We consider a complete network of n processes with identifiers {1, 2, . . . , n}. The number n is always strictly greater than 3t. The communication channels are private, i.e. no one can read or alter messages transmitted along it. Messages sent on a channel may have arbitrary (but finite) delay. A t-adversary can control at most t processes during the Byzantine agreement protocol. Once a process is controlled, it hands all its data over to the adversary and follows its instructions. We call all these controlled processes as faulty ones and other uncontrolled processes as correct ones. Note that the adversary cannot access messages transmitted between correct processes due to private communication channels.
We measure the running time of a protocol by the maximal expected number of communication rounds it takes to reach agreement [6, 10] . Consider a virtual 'global clock' measuring time in the network. This clock cannot be accessed by the processes. Let the delay of a message transmission denote the time elapsed from its sending to its reception. The period of a finite execution of a protocol is the longest delay of a message transmission during this execution. Let the duration of a finite execution denote the total time measured by the global clock divided by the period of this execution. The expected running time of a protocol, is the maximum over all inputs and applicable adversaries, of the average of the duration of executions of the protocol over the random inputs of the processes. In addition, each process divides its local time into rounds and execute a protocol round by round. The time of each round is less than or equal to a period of the execution of a protocol. The expected running time of a protocol can be computed by the expected rounds in execution.
Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement.
Definition 1 (ABA). Let π be any asynchronous protocol in which each process has a binary input. We say that π is an almost-surely terminating, t-resilient ABA protocol if the following properties hold for every t-adversary and every input:
• Termination: With probability one, every correct process terminates and outputs a value.
• Correctness: All correct processes which have terminated have the same outputs. Moreover, if all correct processes have the same input, denoted v, then all correct processes output v.
Asynchronous Broadcast: A-Cast. We will often make use of this asynchronous broadcast primitive, introduced by Bracha [4] (for n > 3t). We follow the terminology in [5] . For completeness, the implementation is provided in Appendix I.
Definition 2 (A-Cast). Let π be any asynchronous protocol initiated by a designated process (the sender) which has an input value u to be broadcast. We say that π is a t-resilient A-Cast protocol if the following properties hold for every t-adversary:
• Termination: 1. If the sender is correct and all correct processes participate in π, then every correct process eventually completes π. 2. If some correct process completes π, then every correct process eventually completes π.
• Correctness:
1. All correct processes which complete π receive the same value v.
2. If the sender is correct, then v = u.
Inferable Verifiable Secret Sharing
In this section, we first state the properties of our IVSS scheme. Then we provide an implementation of IVSS. We prove that our implementation satisfies all the IVSS properties and finally we analyze its fault-detection.
Definition
Definition 3 (Faulty Pair). An unordered pair {i, j} of processes is called a faulty pair if either i or j is faulty.
Our IVSS protocol consists of two subprotocols: S (sharing protocol) and R (reconstruction protocol). These two are invoked separately but R is never called unless S is completed, and R may not be called even if S is completed. If the correct processes do not reconstruct a same secret in R, then a set of faulty pairs will be inferred. We assume that each IVSS invocation is unique for every correct process. This can be easily guaranteed, e.g. by associating with each IVSS invocation the identifier of the dealer and an invocation counter.
Definition 4 (IVSS)
. Let (S, R) be any pair of sharing-reconstruction protocol with a dealer which has a secret s to share. We say that (S, R) is an IVSS protocol if the following properties (called IVSS properties) hold.
• Termination: 1. If the dealer is correct and all correct processes keep participating in protocol S, then every correct process eventually completes protocol S. 2. If some correct process completes protocol S, then every correct process that keeps participating in protocol S eventually completes protocol S. 3. If some correct process completes protocol S and all correct processes begin protocol R and keep participating in protocol R, then every correct process eventually completes protocol R. 4. If some correct process completes protocol R, then every correct process that keeps participating in protocol R eventually completes protocol R.
• Correctness: Once a correct process has completed protocol S, then there is a unique value v such that the following holds. 1. Either every correct process upon completing protocol R outputs v, or a set of new faulty pairs is eventually inferred by correct processes. (In our implementation, the size of the set of new faulty pairs is at least t(n − 3t).) 2. If the dealer is correct, then v = s.
• Secrecy: If the dealer is correct and no correct process invokes protocol R, then the faulty processes have no information about secret s.
Note that, a correct process is said to keep participating in a protocol if it follows the protocol until completion. Another note is that we assume all secrets, random values, and polynomials to be over the integer ring.
Implementation
In our ABA protocol, the processes invoke a set of secret sharing instances in each round (starting from round 1). Every process records its invocations in each round r and A-Casts these invocations in the next round r + 1 to let other processes know about its behavior in round r. We introduce a new component, which we call the certification protocol, to take care of the IVSS invocations from past rounds and infer faulty pairs. The certification protocol is invoked before round 1 and runs concurrently with all invocations of IVSS. Hence our IVSS protocol should be aware of the particular round it is involved in, and should make progress based on the data from past rounds. Therefore, we use the notion IVSS [r] with round number r as a parameter. In this section, we give a high-level description of our IVSS[r] and our certification protocols.
In the sharing phase, we assume that the dealer with secret s selects a random degree-t symmetric bivariate polynomial f such that f (0, 0) = s. Let f i denote the degree-t polynomial such that f i (y) = f (i, y) for y ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The dealer shares secret s by sending polynomial f i to process i. By polynomial interpolation, if the dealer is correct, then any t + 1 correct processes could reconstruct f . Since f is a symmetric polynomial, we should have
Sharing protocol IVSS[r]-S:
1. If the dealer wants to share secret s in round r, it selects a random degree-t symmetric bivariate polynomial f (x, y) such that f (0, 0) = s. Let f i denote the degree-t polynomial such that f i (y) = f (i, y) for y ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The dealer sends f i to process i. 2. If process k receives f k from the dealer, then k sends f k (i) to process i. (Note that f k is supposed to be f k if the dealer is correct.) 3. If process k receives f k from the dealer and receives f i (k) from process i, and
If there is a set M of n − t processes such that the following conditions are satisfied for the dealer: a) for every i, j ∈ M, the dealer receives "equal: (i, j)"; b) for every i, j, p, q ∈ M, the dealer receives "checked r : p, q, {i, j}" from p, then the dealer A-Casts M. (M is called candidate set.) 5. If process k receives M from the dealer and the following conditions are satisfied: a) for every i, j ∈ M, k receives "equal: (i, j)"; b) for every i, j, p, q ∈ M, k receives "checked r : p, q, {i, j}" from p, then k completes the sharing protocol.
Reconstruction protocol IVSS[r]-R:
If there is a set IS k (standing for Interpolation Set) of n − 2t processes such that a) k receives f i from each process i ∈ IS k ; (Note that f i is supposed to be f i if i is correct.) b) there is a symmetric bivariate degree-t polynomialf such thatf (i, j) = f i (j) for all i ∈ IS k and j ∈ M, then k sets v =f (0, 0), A-Casts "ready to complete" and adds this instance of IVSS [r] to CoreInvocations k r . 3. If k completes Step 2 and receives "ready to complete" from n − t processes, then k outputs v and completes the reconstruction protocol.
Certification protocol:
1. Process k initializes empty sets F P k and CoreInvocations c) {i, j} ∈ F P k (Here F P k has been updated after checking condition b, see Step 3), then k A-Casts "checked r ; k, l, {i, j}". (Intuitively, this means k has checked that {i, j} is not a faulty pair according to the invocation history of l before round r.)
This equality may not be true since the dealer or process i could be faulty. If the equality is correct, then k A-Casts "equal: (k, i)". When the dealer receives "equal: i" from every process i in a set M that contains n − t processes, and checks that M does not contains faulty pairs according to the IVSS invocations in the past rounds (see the description of the certification protocol below), the dealer A-Casts M. Intuitively, M is a candidate set that processes could trust to reconstruct the secret. If process k receives set M from the dealer and checks the correctness of M as the dealer, then k completes the sharing protocol.
In the reconstruction phase, processes in M A-Cast their polynomials received from the dealer. When process k receives polynomials from n − 2t processes and these polynomials can be interpolated to a degree-t symmetric bivariate polynomialf , k considersf (0, 0) as the dealer's secret. Iff is not equal to the polynomial f selected by the dealer in the sharing phase, we can show that a set of faulty pairs will be inferred. In order to get every secret sharing instance checked by the certification protocol in the next round, it is important that, when a correct process completes a secret sharing invocation, at least t + 1 correct processes take this invocation as its history invocation. Therefore, after getting polynomial f , k first A-Casts a message "ready to complete" and records the invocation. Then k completes the reconstruction phase if k receives n − t "ready to complete".
Our certification protocol handles the history of invocations. Process k uses set F P k to track the faulty pairs it inferred. In each round r, k records all invocations of IVSS[r] and adds them into a set called CoreInvocations k r . Then, at the beginning of round r + 1, k will A-Cast CoreInvoations k r to let other processes know its action in round r. Intuitively, this means that every correct process should know what the other processes have done in the past rounds. If a process k receives f i from i and f j from j but f i (j) = f j (i) for some IVSS instance, then k knows that at least one of i, j is faulty and adds unordered pair {i, j} into F P k . The word "inferable" in IVSS means that correct pairs could infer faulty pairs during the execution. If k receives CoreInvoations l r from process l, then it checks for each invocation Á in CoreInvoations l r that every correct process in M of Á should A-Cast its polynomial in the beginning of the reconstruction phase, and no pair of correct processes should be considered as a faulty pair according to these invocations. If k has checked that an unordered pair {i, j} is not a faulty pair according to the invocation history of l before round r, then k will A-Cast "checked r : k, l, {i, j}". In the sharing protocol, a correct process accepts a candidate set M only if every pair of processes in M are checked by every process in M.
Proof of IVSS properties
Lemma 1. If i, j, k are correct processes, then unordered pair {i, j} will not be added to F P k .
Proof:
The pair {i, j} will be added to F P k only if there is an invocation Á of IVSS[r] such that i, j ∈ M and the polynomials f i and f j A-Casted by i and j in Step 1 of IVSS[r]-R satisfy f i (j) = f j (i). However, if i, j ∈ M then i and j must have A-Casted "equal: (i, j)" and "equal: (j, i)" and hence must have checked that f i (j) = f j (i) in IVSS[r]-S. Thus {i, j} will not be added to F P k .
Lemma 2.
In round r (r 1), if i, j, k, and l are correct processes, then k eventually A-Cast "checked r : k, l, {i, j}".
Proof:
Since {i, j} is not in F P k by Lemma 1, we only need to check conditions a and b of Step 5 in the certification protocol.
Condition a: Since l is correct, l will A-Cast CoreInvocations Taking above together, k will A-Cast "checked r : k, l, {i, j}". Lemma 3. Let N be a subset of {1, . . . , n} and |N | t + 1. Let {f i } i∈N be a set of degree-t univariate polynomials. If f i (j) = f j (i) for all i, j ∈ N , then there is a unique symmetric bivariate degree-t polynomial f such that f (i, j) = f i (j) for all i, j ∈ N .
Proof: Select any subset N 0 of N such that |N 0 | = t + 1. Let
Consider any arbitrary i in N . We have Since |M| n − t, then |C| n − 2t. Let f i be the polynomial i (i ∈ C) received from the dealer. Since C ⊂ M, we have f i (j) = f j (i) for all i, j ∈ C. By Lemma 3, there is a symmetric bivariate degree-t polynomialf such thatf (i, j) = f i (j) for all i, j ∈ C. Thus C satisfies the conditions in Step 2 of IVSS[r]-R. It follows that every correct process will complete Step 2 of IVSS[r]-R and A-Casts "ready to complete". Therefore, every correct process will receive at least n − t "ready to complete" messages and complete IVSS[r]-R.
Termination ( We now turn to the correctness properties.
Suppose that a correct process has completed the sharing protocol. By Lemma 3, there is a symmetric bivariate degree-t polynomialf such thatf (i, j) = f i (j) for all i, j ∈ C where C is the set of all correct processes in M. We denotef (0, 0) as v.
Correctness (1):
If some correct process k completes IVSS[r]-R and outputs a value different from v, then IS k must be different from C. And there must be some process i ∈ IS k and some process j ∈ C such thatf (i, j) = f i (j), otherwise IS k also interpolatesf and outputf (0, 0).
we have f i (j) = f j (i), which means some faulty pair will be inferred (we will analysis how many pairs could be inferred in the following section).
Correctness (2):
If the dealer is correct, then f i (j) = f (i, j) for all i, j ∈ C where f is the polynomial selected by the dealer. Thusf = f and v =f (0, 0) = f (0, 0) = s.
Secrecy: By polynomial interpolation, the combined view of the t faulty processes is not enough to compute the initial random degree-t polynomial selected by the dealer. As long as no correct process invokes IVSS[r]-R, the shared secret is independent of the information obtained by the faulty processes. Hence, the faulty processes have no information of the shared secret.
So all the IVSS properties hold for IVSS [r] . The theorem follows.
Fault-Detection Analysis
We introduce the following convention for the analysis of Fault-Detection in the certification protocol. . This is the best case for correct processes. Therefore without loss of generality, we use the following convention.
Consider an instance Ê of IVSS[r]-R in CoreInvocations

Convention. In any instance of IVSS[r]-R and any round r, every faulty process in the corresponding set M eventually A-Casts a polynomial (can be arbitrary) according to Step 1 of IVSS[r]-R.
Consider an arbitrary instance of IVSS[r]. With the above convention, let f i be the polynomial eventually A-Casted by process i ∈ M in Step 1 of IVSS[r]-R. We say that a set S ⊂ M of at least n − 2t processes is an interpolation set if there is a symmetric bivariate degree-t polynomial g such that g(i, j) = f i (j) for all i ∈ S. Two interpolation sets S and S ′ are different, if the corresponding bivariate polynomial are different, which implies |S ∩ S ′ | t by Lemma 3.
For an instance Á of IVSS [r] , recall that by Lemma 3 the polynomials that processes in C received from the dealer actually define a unique symmetric bivariate degree-t polynomial, and therefore define a unique secret s. We say that s is the secret defined by Á.
Definition 5. Let be the event that at least one of the correct processes output a value s ′ in the reconstruction phase of Á such that s ′ = s.
If never occurs, then we could get a common coin with high probability (we will show this later in Section 4). Thus it is significant to analyze the situation when occurs.
Lemma 4.
could only occur in some instance Á of IVSS[r] when n 4t.
Proof:
If occurs, then there are at least two different interpolation sets. One of these is the set C of correct processes in M, the other one is the interpolation set IS causing some correct process to output a different secret. Since |C| n−2t, |IS| n−2t, |C ∩IS| t, we have |C ∪IS| = |C|+|IS|−|C ∩IS| 2n − 5t. If n > 4t, then |C ∪ IS| > n − t. This is impossible since |C ∪ IS| |M| = n − t. Therefore, could only occur when n 4t.
Lemma 5. If occurs in some instance Á of IVSS[r]
, then at least t(n − 3t) faulty pairs will be inferred by every correct process due to Á.
Proof: When occurs, at least one correct process completes instance Á. According to Step 3 of IVSS[r]-R, there are at least n−2t correct processes that have A-Casted "ready to complete". According to
Step 2 of IVSS[r]-R, these correct processes must have added Á into the set CoreInvocations. In the next round r + 1, the candidate set M of any instance of IVSS[r + 1] will contain at least one of these n − 2t processes since M = n − t and n − 2t > t. Thus Á will be checked by every correct process in the certification protocol. Since the faulty pairs are inferred from the polynomials A-Casted by processes in M of Á, all correct processes will infer the same faulty pairs. So we only need to prove the lemma for correct process k. Let {S 1 , S 2 . . . , S r } be all maximal interpolation sets with respect to the inclusion relation of sets. Since occurs, there must be at least two maximal interpolation sets, one of which implies the secret s defined by Á and another of which implies the secret s ′ = s, i.e. r 2. Suppose i, j ∈ 1, . . . , r and i = j. By the assumption of maximal interpolation sets, |S i ∩ S j | t. Let S 0 be the interpolation set in {S 1 , S 2 . . . , S r } with the smallest cardinal number. Since |S i ∪ S j | |M| = n − t and
Also from the definition of the interpolation set, we have |S 0 | n − 2t.
Suppose the corresponding symmetric bivariate polynomial for S 0 is f 0 . Let f 0 i be the polynomial with f 0
Recall that f j is the polynomial eventually A-Casted by process j ∈ M in Step 1 of IVSS[r]-R of instance Á. For any i ∈ M but i ∈ S 0 , we have f i = f 0 i because otherwise S 0 ∪ i is an interpolation set bigger than S 0 , which contradicts the fact that S 0 is maximal. Since
for j ∈ S 0 ) which leads to the faulty pair {i, j}. Therefore, for each i ∈ M but i ∈ S 0 , k will infer at least |S 0 | − t faulty pairs. In total, k could infer at least (|S 0 | − t)(n − t − |S 0 |) faulty pairs. Proof: Since occurs, there must be a correct process (say k) that completes instance Á r . Then, by
Step 3 of IVSS[r]-R, k must have received "ready to complete" from n−t processes. According to Step 2 of IVSS[r]-R, these n − t processes must have added instance Á r into CoreInvocations * r . Then there are at least n − 2t correct processes (denoted by S) that have added instance Á r into CoreInvocations * ,r . Now consider round r ′ > r. In any instance Á r ′ of IVSS[r ′ ], set M, A-Casted by the dealer, contains at least one correct process (denoted by l) from S since |M| n − t and |S| n − 2t t + 1. If i and j are both in the set M of Á r ′ , then every correct process k ′ in M must A-Cast "checked r ′ , k ′ , l, {i, j}" according to Step 5 
of IVSS[r ′ ]-S. By
Step 5 of our certification protocol, k ′ must have received the corresponding polynomials of i and j A-Cast in Step 1 of IVSS[r ′ ]-R. However, this would make k ′ add {i, j} into F P k ′ and not A-Cast "checked r ′ : k ′ , l, {i, j}". This is a contradiction. Therefore, i and j could not appear simultaneously in candidate set M of any instance of IVSS[r ′ ] with r ′ > r.
Lemma 7.
If n = 3t + δ, then there are at most 3t δ + 1 rounds where occurs. Proof: Suppose occurs in round r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r c and denote the faulty pairs that could be inferred for these rounds by S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S c . By Lemma 6, S i is different from S j for 1 i, j c and i = j. According to Lemma 5, there will be at least c · (n − 3t)t different faulty pairs inferred. Since each faulty process can only appear in n faulty pairs, we have t · n c · (n − 3t)t. Thus, c tn (n−3t)t = 3t δ + 1.
From IVSS to Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement
Using our IVSS[r] protocol, we now design an ABA protocol (following the reduction scheme of Canetti and Rabin [6] ). The first step is to get a common coin. In the common coin protocol of [6] , every process shares n random secrets using n different invocations of the AVSS protocol of [6] . Following Figure 5 -9 of [5] and using our IVSS[r] protocol, we obtain an Inferable Common Coin (ICC) protocol which always terminates. Definition 6 (ICC). Let π be any protocol where every process has a random input and a binary output. We say that π is a terminating, t-resilient Inferable Common Coin protocol if the following properties (called ICC properties) hold for every t-adversary.
• Termination.
1. If all correct processes keep participating in π, then every correct process eventually completes. 2. If some correct process completes π, then every other correct process that keeps participating in π eventually completes.
• Correctness. For every invocation, either -for each v ∈ {0, 1}, with probability at least 1/4, every correct process upon completing π outputs v; or -a set of faulty pairs is eventually inferred by correct processes.
Lemma 8.
For n > 3t and each round r, there is a terminating, t-resilient Inferable Common Coin protocol.
Proof: The protocol implementing ICC by using our IVSS[r] subprotocol is a slight variant of figure 5-9 of [5] . We call this protocol ICC[r]. The proof is in Appendix II.
The second step is to use the common coin protocol to get an ABA protocol. In [6] , Canetti and Rabin use their common coin protocol (that terminates with probability 1 − ε) to get an ABA protocol (that terminates with probability 1 − ε). We replace the common coin protocol of [6] by ICC[r] to obtain our almost-surely terminating ABA protocol.
Theorem 2 (Byzantine Agreement). If n = 3t + δ, then there is an almost-surely terminating ABA protocol with expected running time O( t δ ). Proof: By Lemma 7, we know there are at most 3t δ + 1 rounds in which the adversary could break the correctness of secret sharing. In the rest of the rounds, all correct processes reconstruct the same value and this value is equal to the secret of the dealer if the dealer is correct, with which we can have a common coin that is sufficient for Byzantine agreement with constant expected running time. Therefore, the expected running time of our ABA protocol is O( t δ ). we give the details in Appendix III. If we take δ = 1 in the above theorem, we have the following corollary, which improves the result of Abraham, Dolev, and Halpern [1] .
Corollary 1.
If n = 3t + 1, then there is an almost-surely terminating, optimally resilient ABA protocol with expected running time O(t).
If we take δ = εt where ε > 0, we have the following corollary, which improves the result of Feldman and Micali [7] . n. Wait until |T i | = t + 1, then assign T i = T i and A-Cast "attach T i to i". (we say that the secrets {x j,i |j ∈ T i } are attached to process i.) 4. Define a set A i . Add process j to A i if the A-Cast "attach T j to j" has been completed and T j ⊆ T i .
Wait until |A i | = n − t, then assign A i = A i and A-cast "i accepts A i ". 5. Define a set S i . Add process j to S i if "j accepts A j " is received from j and A j ⊆ A i . Wait until |S i | = n − t, then A-Cast "Reconstruct Enabled". Let S i denote the current content of S i and H i denote the current content of A i . Then A-Cast (H i , S i ). 6. Participates in IVSS[r]-R(x k,j ) for every k ∈ T j and j ∈ A i . Let y k,j be the corresponding output. 7. Let u = ⌈0.87n⌉. Every process j ∈ A i is associated with a value, say v j , which is computed as follows: v j = k∈Tj y k,j mod u. 8. Wait until receiving ( H j , S j ) from j with H j ⊆ A i and S j ⊆ S i and the values associated with all processes in H j are computed. Now if there exists a process k ∈ H j such that v k = 0, then output 0. Otherwise output 1.
We now state and prove the following lemmas which are slight variants of lemmas 5.28-5.31 presented in [5] . Proof: First we show that every correct process will A-Cast "Reconstruct Enabled". By termination property (1) of our IVSS[r] protocol, every correct process eventually completes IVSS-S(x j,k ) for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n} and correct j. Since there are at least n − t correct processes, for each correct process i, T i will eventually contain at least t + 1 (actually n − t) processes and thus i will eventually A-Cast "attach T i to i". So eventually, correct process i will receive "attach T j to j" from every correct process j. Now since every process k that is included in T j will be eventually included in T i (by termination property (2) of IVSS[r]), T j ⊆ T i will eventually hold. Therefore, every correct process j will eventually be included in A i . Thus for every correct process i, A i will eventually be of size n − t and hence i will A-Cast "i accepts A i ". Following the same argument, S i will be of size n − t and hence i will A-Cast "Reconstruct Enabled" and A-Cast (H i , S i ).
We now show that all correct processes will complete ICC [r] . By the lemma above, we only need to show that at least one of the correct processes will complete ICC [r] . Suppose by contradiction that no correct process will complete ICC [r] . Let i be a correct process. If i receives "attach T j to j" from j and includes j in A i , then eventually every other correct process will do the same. Hence if i invokes IVSS[r]-R(x k,j ) for k ∈ T j and j ∈ A i , then eventually every other correct process will also invoke IVSS[r]-R(x k,j ). By termination property (3) of IVSS[r], all correct processes will complete this IVSS[r]-R(x k,j ). Therefore, the values associated with all processes in H i will be computed. So i will complete the protocol, in contradiction with the assumption that no correct process will complete. Therefore, all correct processes will complete.
In the certification protocol, each process need to check all the past invocations in past rounds. However, since every correct process does this in every round, it is equal to that each process in every round checks all the invocations in the previous round. Therefore, all "checked r ; k, l, {i, j}" could be finished in constant time for correct process i, j, k, l. Proof: The correctness property of IVSS [r] ensures that for each k ∈ T i there is a fixed value y k,i such that all correct processes will output y k,i in IVSS[r]-S(x k,i ) or a set of faulty pairs will be inferred. Let v i = k∈Ti y k,i mod u, then every correct process will associate v i with i except that event occurs in some instances of IVSS[r], i.e., a set of faulty pairs will eventually be inferred by correct processes.
It remains to show that v i is uniformly distributed over [0, . . . , u − 1], and is independent of the values associated with the other processes. A correct process starts reconstructing the secrets attached to process i only after it completes the "attach T i to i" A-Cast. So the set T i is fixed before any correct process invokes IVSS[r]-R(x k,i ) for some process k. The secrecy property of IVSS[r] now ensures that, by the time the set T i is fixed, the adversary view of the invocations of IVSS[r]-S(x k,i ) where the dealers are correct is distributed independently of the shared values. Since T i contains at least one correct process and every correct process's shared secrets are uniformly distributed and mutually independent, the sum v i is uniformly and independently distributed over [0, . . . , u − 1].
Lemma 12.
Once a correct process A-Casts "Reconstruct Enabled", there is a set M such that 1. For every process j ∈ M , some correct process has received "attach T j to j" from the A-Cast of j. 2. If any correct process k receives ( H j , S j ) from j with H j ⊆ A k and S j ⊆ S k and the values associated with all processes in
Proof: Let i be the first correct process to A-Cast "Reconstruct Enabled". Let M be the set of processes, k, for which k ∈ A l for at least t + 1 processes l ∈ S i . We now show that all processes in M satisfy the properties of the lemma.
It is clear that M ⊆ H i . Thus process i has received "attach T j to j" for every j ∈ M . Since i is assumed to be correct, the first part of the lemma is proved.
We now prove the second part. First S j contains n − t 2t + 1 processes. Now if k ′ ∈ M then k ′ belongs to A l for at least t + 1 processes l ∈ S i . This ensures that there is at least one process l which belongs to S j as well as S i . Now l ∈ S j implies that j has ensured that A l ⊆ H j . Consequently, k ′ ∈ H j . It remains to show that |M | n 3 . We use a counting argument for this purpose. Let h = |H i |. We have h n − t. Consider the h × n table Λ (relative to process i), where Λ l,k = one iff i has received "l accepts A l " from l before A-Casting "Reconstruct Enabled" and k ∈ A l . Then M is the set of processes k such that the kth column in Λ has at least t + 1 one entries. There are n − t one entries in each row of Λ; thus there are h(n − t) one entries in Λ.
Let m denote the minimum number of columns in Λ that contain at least t + 1 one entries. We show that m n 3 . Clearly, the worst distribution of one entries in Λ is letting m columns be all one entries and letting each of the remaining n − m columns have t one entries. This distribution requires the number of one entries to be no more than mh + (n − m)t. Thus, we must have:
This gives m h(n−t)−nt h−t
. Since h n − t and n 3t + 1, we have
This shows that |M | n 3 .
Lemma 13. For every invocation of ICC[r], either
• For each v ∈ {0, 1}, with probability at least 1/4, all correct processes output v; or • A set of faulty pairs will eventually be inferred by correct processes.
Proof: If occurs in any instance of IVSS[r] while executing ICC[r]
, then a set of faulty pairs will be inferred by correct processes. We prove the first part of the lemma assuming does not occur. Suppose correct process j completes ICC[r] with respect to ( H k , S k ). Since does not occur, by Lemma 11, for every process i in A j , there is a fixed value v i that is distributed uniformly and independently over [0, . . . , u − 1]. Now we consider two cases:
• Let M be the set of processes discussed in the lemma above. Clearly if v i = 0 for some i ∈ M , then all correct processes associate 0 with j and output 0. The probability that at least one process i ∈ M has v i = 0 is 1 − 1 − Hence we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Protocol ICC[r] is a terminating, t-resilient inferable common coin protocol.
Proof: The termination properties follow from Lemma 10. The correctness properties follow from Lemma 13.
Appendix III. From Common Coin to Byzantine Agreement
First we recall a voting protocol called Vote from [5] which is a primitive required for the construction of our ABA protocol. Protocol Vote computes whether a detectable majority for some value among the (binary) inputs of all processes. The output of protocol Vote is a tuple with the following meanings.
• For σ ∈ {1, 2}, output (σ, 2) means that there is an overwhelming majority for σ. Therefore, the lemma is proved.
Lemma 19. In our ABA protocol, if all correct processes have the same input σ, then all correct processes complete and output σ.
Proof: If all correct processes have the same input σ, then by Lemma 15 every correct process will output (y 1 , m 1 ) = (σ, 2) by the end of Step a. Therefore, every correct process A-Casts "complete with σ" in the first iteration. Therefore, every correct process will receive at least n − t "complete with σ" A-Casts, and at most t "complete with σ ′ " A-Casts. Consequently, every correct process will output σ.
Lemma 20. In our ABA protocol, if a correct process completes with output σ, then all correct processes will complete with output σ.
Proof: Let us first show that if a correct process A-Casts "complete with σ" for some value σ, then all correct processes will A-Cast "complete with σ". Let k be the first round when a correct process i A-Casts "complete with σ". By Lemma 16, every correct process i has y k = σ and either m k = 2 or m k = 1. Therefore, no correct process A-Casts "complete with σ ′ " at iteration k. Furthermore, all correct processes invoke the voting protocol in round k + 1 with input σ. Lemma 15 now implies that, by the end of Step a of round k + 1, every correct process has (y k+1 , m k+1 ) = (σ, 2). Thus, all correct processes A-Cast "complete with σ", either at round k or at round k + 1.
Now assume a correct process completes with output σ. Thus, at least one correct process A-casted "complete with σ". Consequently, all correct processes A-Cast "complete with σ". Hence, every correct process will receive at least n−t "complete with σ" A-Casts and at most t "complete with σ ′ " A-Casts. Therefore, every correct process will output σ.
Lemma 21. If all correct processes have initiated and completed some round k, then with probability at least 1/4, all correct processes have the same value for v k+1 or a set of faulty pairs will eventually be inferred by correct processes.
Proof:
We have two cases here. If all correct processes execute Step III in round k, then all correct processes set their v k+1 to the output of ICC [r] . According to the correctness property of ICC[r], the lemma is true.
Otherwise, some correct process has set v k+1 = σ for some σ ∈ {0, 1}, either in Step I or Step II of round k. By Lemma 17, no correct process will set its v k+1 to σ ′ . According to the correctness property of ICC [r] , with probability at least 1/4, all correct processes have output σ or a set of faulty pairs will eventually be inferred by correct processes.
Lemma 22. Let n = 3t + δ, then all correct processes complete the ABA protocol in expected running time O( t δ ). Proof: We first show that all correct processes complete protocol ABA within constant time after the first correct process initiates a "complete with σ" A-Cast in Step III of the protocol. Assume the first correct process initiates a "complete with σ" A-Cast in round k. Then all correct processes participate in the voting and common coin protocols of all the rounds up to round k + 1. We have seen in the proof of Lemma 20 that all correct processes will A-Cast "complete with σ" in round k + 1. All these A-Casts complete in constant time. Then every correct process completes the ABA protocol after completing t + 1 of these A-Casts. Consequently, once the first correct process A-Casts "complete with σ", the ABA protocol completes in constant time.
Let the random variable τ count the number of rounds until the first correct process A-Casts "complete with σ". We have Prob(τ > k) = Prob(τ = 1) · Prob(τ = 2|τ = 1) . . . · Prob(τ = k|τ = 1 ∩ . . . ∩ τ = k − 1).
If event
does not occur in round k, we have Prob(τ = k|τ = 1 ∩ . . . ∩ τ = k − 1) 
